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any priorities in the above situation the court should have permitted
all of the judgment creditors to share pro rata (after the state
and city claims were satisfied). There is something to be said
for either disposition. CPLR 5234 might be reconsidered with
an eye towards giving priority status to judgment creditors who
serve subpoenas or restraining notices under article 52.
ARTICLE 55 -

APPEALS

GENERALLY

Motion to dismiss for failure to diligently prosecute an appealIndication that courts are becoming stricter.
In Tonkonogy v. Jaffin,24s a motion was made to dismiss
appeals taken from orders dismissing a complaint for insufficiency
and a judgment entered thereon.
The notices of appeal were
served in December 1963. The motion to dismiss was made in
May 1964 on the ground that the appellants had not taken any
steps to perfect the appeals. The appellate division, first department,
granted the motion, holding that an undue delay in the perfection
of an appeal tends to frustrate the rights of the respondent and
that the rules 249 pertaining to the time limitations for perfecting
an appeal are not to be lightly regarded. The court pointed out
that a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court and stated the requirements
that the appellant, in opposing such a motion, must show that the
appeal has merit and that there is a satisfactory excuse for his
failure to perfect the appeal.
An analogy may be drawn between the instant case and the
2 50
case of Sortino v. Fisher.
Sortino involved a motion to dismiss
for failure to prosecute the action (as opposed to an appeal).
The appellate division, first department, reversed the order of the
lower court which had denied the motion, holding that the delay
was substantial and unreasonable.2 5 1 It further pointed out that an
excuse based on the plaintiff's attorney's press of business would
be rejected. This argument was also advanced in Tonkonogy,
and was rejected, along with the excuse that the appellants lacked
funds with which to prosecute the appeal. The court disposed
of -the latter excuse by pointing out that a person who lacks
App. Div. 2d 264, 249 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1st Dep't 1964).
249 CPLR 5530. There are rules in each of the four departments. N.Y.
APi. Div. RR. V. XI, XII, XIII (2), pt. 1 (1st Dep't 1963) are specifically
involved in this case.
25020 App. Div. 2d 25, 245 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st Dep't 1963).
A scholarly discussion of the Sortino case is available in 38 ST. JoHiN's
L. REv. 448-52(1964).
251 The sting has been taken out of the Sortino case by the amendment
of CPLR 3216 by the legislature in 1964. See 38 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 406,
461-63 (1964).
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funds may be able to take advantage of the liberal provisions of
the CPLR regarding the papers on an appeal, 252 or, in a proper
case, of the provisions regarding pauper status.253
In the earlier cases 25 4 the usual procedure had been for the
court to grant a dismissal conditioned on the delinquent party's
failure to perfect the appeal within a stated period of time thereafter. The holding in the Tonkonogy case is an indication that
the courts will construe the time provisions more strictly than
the earlier cases had, and it serves as a warning to the Bar
that the time limitations for perfecting appeals must not be
casually treated. A party opposing the motion to dismiss must
show that the appeal has merit and that there is a valid excuse
for failing to perfect the appeal. What an adequate excuse will
be in a given case will depend on its own peculiar facts. The
Sortino case should be consulted for guidelines.
CPLR 5530(a) and (b) set out the time requirements for the
filing of records and briefs, and when they should be served.
But subdivision (c) states that the
appellate division in each department may by rule applicable in the
department prescribe other limitations of time different from those prescribed
in subdivisions (a) and (b) for filing and serving records on appeal ...
As a result of subdivision (c), subdivisions (a) and (b) have
been virtually superseded by the rules of the appellate division
in each of the four departments. The attorney should be mindful
to consult the time requirements contained in the rules of the
individual departments which, to the extent inconsistent with
CPLR 5530(a) and (b), supersede the latter.
If a party has a legitimate reason for not being able to
comply with the time requirements set out in CPLR 5530(a) and
(b) or the applicable appellate division rules, he would be best
advised to apply for additional time, perhaps by motion under
CPLR 2004, or, if possible, by stipulation with the respondent.2 5Proper use of the transcript and appendices;
Settlement of the transcript- Rule 5525;
Use of the appendix - Rile 5528(a) (5).
In Perry v. Tauro,256 the plaintiffs appealed from an order
of the supreme court which denied their application to eliminate
CPLR 5529.
253 CPLR Art. 11.
252

254 E.g., U.S. Hat Co. v. Title Guar. Trust Co., 273 N.Y. 586, 7 N.E.2d
705 (1937) ; Maronet v. 1010 Rogers, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 793, 232 N.Y.S.2d
757 (lst Dep't 1962) ; Eagle Contractors of Utica, Inc. v. Black, 5 App. Div.
2d 954, 171 N.Y.S.2d 380 (4th Dep't 1958).
255 E.g., N.Y. Arp. Div. RR. XI (6) & XII (5), pt. 1 (1st Dep't 1963).
256 21 App. Div. 2d 804, 250 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2d Dep't 1964).

